Not all has been doom-and-gloom during the COVID-19 pandemic. McGeorge graduates earned an 81% first-time bar pass rate on the February 2021 California Bar Exam, the second highest pass rate among all California law schools and the second highest pass rate for McGeorge over the past 25 years – having passed at 86% on the October 2020 exam. The perseverance and dedication of our students was on further display as graduates in McGeorge’s Accelerated Honors Program, the only one of its kind in the nation, achieved a staggering 100% first-time pass rate.  Congratulations to all our bar passers!

Read the full press release here.

Every year an estimated 5 million, or 1 in 10 older Americans experience elder abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Together, we can build the social supports that can prevent this abuse and keep everyone safe as we age. World Elder Abuse Awareness Day (WEAAD) – commemorated on June 15th every year – is an opportunity for people to take action to protect older people by raising awareness about elder abuse, why it occurs, and what we can do to stop it. We can act collectively to support justice for all. Check out the McGeorge Elder Health & Law Clinic talk about why they are commemorating Elder Abuse Awareness Day and what tips you can use to identify elder abuse.

If you, or someone you know is experiencing elder abuse, please call Adult Protective Services at (916) 874-9377. You can also contact the Family Justice Center at (916) 875-4673 or McGeorge Elder Health & Law Clinic at (916) 340) 6080.

The National Black Prosecutors Association (NBPA), established in 1983, is a professional member organization comprised of over 800 prosecutors.  Their mission is to recruit, train, and advance the careers of minority attorneys as prosecutors at all levels of government.  This year’s annual NBPA job fair will be held online on Tuesday, August 17, 2021. There’s still time to register at a discounted rate, after which point the registration price will rise to $50 for students and recent graduates, and $100 for experienced lawyers.

Registration Period
Law Students & 2021 Graduates
Experienced Attorneys

General Registration

May 12th – June 30th

Free $25

Late Registration

July 1st – July 23rd

$50 $100

For additional information about the NBPA and to register for the conference, visit www.blackprosecutors.org.

Oh no, you’ve found a parking ticket on your car or a red-light camera took your selfie in an intersection and sent you some fan mail. What happens if you just don’t pay it? Apparently, a lot. I mean, New York City even has an Office of Parking Summons Advocate that assists unrepresented/underrepresented members of the community with parking and camera violation issues. Under COVID guidelines, the time limit for submitting hearing requests and appeals have been suspended; no additional penalties will be added to unpaid tickets on or after March 22, 2020 (though interest continues to accrue on tickets issued before this date).

So, what can actually happen? Late fees, interest on the ticket/fee, installation of a car boot, suspended license, suspended registration, court summons, bench warrant for failure to appear at court summons, and even impounded vehicles.

But what happens if you’ve filed for bankruptcy? Specifically, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy which allows you to retain your property while you pay off your debts over three to five years? Enter Chicago v. Fulton.

The City of Chicago was busy! Many, many vehicles had been seized by Chicago for unpaid parking and red-light tickets. Aside: this was a class-action case and Robbin Fulton, as the named party, served as the class representative (despite no promises for Taco Tuesdays or Pizza Fridays). Establishing and proving a class is a massive undertaking, so if nothing else, that’s a remarkable accomplishment here. Fulton filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and Chicago refused to return Fulton’s vehicle. Both the bankruptcy court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Chicago was obligated to return the vehicles upon filing for bankruptcy.

The Supremes decide to go in a different direction, instead answering the eternal question that plagues us all and keeps us up at night: “whether an entity violates [the automatic stay] by retaining possession of a debtor’s property after a bankruptcy petition is filed.” Basically, did Chicago take any action to exercise control over the cars after the debtors filed for bankruptcy? The debtors argued yes, Chicago refused to return our vehicles. Chicago argued no, as they simply kept the property they already had. The Court held that “mere retention of property does not violate” the automatic stay. Great. Thanks for answering a question that doesn’t actually answer anything (très Suprême).

Sonia, in true Sonia fashion, points this out:

[T]he Court has not decided whether and when §362(a)’s other provisions may require a creditor to return a debtor’s property . . . Nor has the Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors’ separate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee or debtor under §542(a). The City’s conduct may very well violate one or both of these other provisions. The Court does not decide one way or the other.

We’re diving into the bankruptcy code! §362 is the automatic stay provision. This pauses individual creditor efforts to collect debts; instead, everyone uses the bankruptcy procedures. §542 is the turnover provision. This transfers property to the trustee, disgorging the debtor and any preferential transferees. Under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the idea is that the trustee will gather up what they can and then dole out what’s available. Under Chapter 13, the debtor keeps their property and makes payments toward a court-approved repayment plan. Chapter 13 is only available if the debtor has “regular income.” (11 USC § 109(e))

So, hypothetically, what happens if someone needs their car to commute to work in order to maintain their employment to meet the terms of their Chapter 13 repayment plan? Sonia highlights just this type of situation with respondent George Peake:

Before the City seized his car, Peake relied on his 200,000-mile 2007 Lincoln MKZ to travel 45 miles each day from his home on the South Side of Chicago to his job in Joliet, Illinois. In June 2018, when the City impounded Peake’s car for unpaid parking and red-light tickets, the vehicle was worth just around $4,300 (and was already serving as collateral for a roughly $7,300 debt). Without his car, Peake had to pay for rides to Joliet. He filed for bankruptcy, hoping to recover his vehicle and repay his $5,393.27 debt to the City through a Chapter 13 plan. The City, however, refused to return the car until either Peake paid $1,250 upfront or after the court confirmed Peake’s bankruptcy plan. As a result, Peake’s car remained in the City’s possession for months. By denying Peake access to the vehicle he needed to commute to work, the City jeopardized Peake’s ability to make payments to all his creditors, the City included. Surely, Peake’s vehicle would have been more valuable in the hands of its owner than parked in the City’s impound lot.

George drives an older, high mileage vehicle that has already been collateralized. Also, he owes Chicago over $5K… from parking tickets? How? Having bus commuted over 60 miles away, it can take forever and be cost prohibitive without employer/institutional supplementation (thanks, Metro). Hopefully, George was able ride share with a colleague. But what is Chicago even hoping for? George’s car was already collateral for a different debt!

Drivers in low-income communities across the country face similar vicious cycles: A driver is assessed a fine she cannot immediately pay; the balance balloons as late fees accrue; the local government seizes the driver’s vehicle, adding impounding and storage fees to the growing debt; and the driver, now without reliable transportation to and from work, finds it all but impossible to repay her debt and recover her vehicle. Such drivers may turn to Chapter 13 bankruptcy for a “fresh start.” But without their vehicles, many debtors quickly find themselves unable to make their Chapter 13 payments. The cycle thus continues, disproportionately burdening communities of color . . . and interfering not only with debtors’ ability to earn an income and pay their creditors but also with their access to childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other necessities.

This is the part where we can all express our shock and horror that there is a disparate impact, that racism and white supremacy play a central role. Thankfully, people have already pointed this out in investigative reporting and there are tools available like Do Not Pay and Upsolve that may reduce the barriers to contesting tickets and tackling the administrative procedures. And in typical John Oliver fashion, he talked about this issue IN 2015!

Direct-to-consumer (DTC) shipping for craft breweries has rightly become a hot issue and is gaining momentum. With the COVID-19 pandemic wiping out two of craft beer’s main sources of income, taproom sales and keg beer sales for restaurants and bars, the only main income stream that breweries had during the pandemic was DTC sales. They simply weren’t enough for many breweries.

The laws surrounding DTC are a mess and differ from state to state.  Some states allow out-of-state alcohol manufacturers to ship to customers within the state, some prohibit it entirely, and some allow in-state breweries to ship within the state but not out-of-state breweries. This raises an interesting and tumultuous relationship between the dormant commerce clause’s anti-discrimination principle and the Twenty-First Amendment’s relegation of alcohol control to the states. It’s complicated and the subject matter of my summer law review article that I am working on now.

An interesting wrinkle in this arena is that due to the wine lobby’s national strength, wineries have enjoyed more permissive DTC laws across the country—think wine clubs. Everyone wants Napa wine, right? So someone in Michigan could order a fine Napa vintage from California directly from the winery, but that same person couldn’t order a Pliny the Elder or an El Segundo Brewing Company Mayberry IPA from the same state. It makes no sense and likely raises equal protection issues as well.

California, to its credit, is trying to rectify this problem through legislation instead of courts. Current California law, like many other states, allows a winegrower who holds a direct shipper permit to ship directly to a California consumer. Notably, California allows in-state breweries to ship to in-state consumers. A new bill, SB 517 (2021) seeks to allow “a person licensed in this state or any other state as a beer manufacturer who obtains a beer direct shipper permit to sell and ship beer directly to a resident of California….” If SB 517 passes, craft beer fans will be able to point and click and have that Heady Topper or latest Tree House Brewing Company IPA delivered directly to their doors.

This bill is smart. With mounting pressure and legal challenges to DTC restrictions across the country, SB 517 seeks to head off the litigation morass. In my opinion, the days of DTC prohibitions are coming to a close primarily due to the economic protectionism that such prohibitions encourage—namely, favoring in-state breweries over out-of-state breweries. The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in and recently denied certiorari in a case that would have addressed this issue for reasons not relevant here. And while several web-based ordering platforms exist out there, they operate in a regulatory gray area that could pose a risk to breweries.

DTC is overall a good and healthy thing for independent beer. It’s not without its headaches, like permitting and making sure taxes are properly paid. But as we saw with the pandemic, independent beer needs new markets. And while relying on the local community will and should continue to be the main source of income for most independent breweries, the opportunity to reach new consumers over the internet can only be helpful.

Here’s to ordering those hard-to-find unicorns and having them show up at your front door. Let’s hope SB 517 passes. Don’t be surprised if Big Beer is in the background opposing it.

Here’s a link to the bill:  https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB517

 

Criminal Procedure is a poorly named class: you don’t learn how to become a kingpin. It should just be called “Totally Legit State-Sponsored Violence.” We read case after case justifying horrific police misconduct. The court goes out of its way to prioritize officer safety and discretion. It’s insane. One case was only an excerpt: Utah v. Strieff.

Me being me, I ignored the reading assigned and read Thomas’ full opinion and Sonia’s dissent. Then, I reread the dissent. And then I told my friends and family about the dissent. And now, Internet, I am here to share the good news with you: I love this dissent and so will you. Let’s start with the first paragraph:

The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.

Okay, wait the police can do what? I’m over here minding my own business literally just existing and the police can just “Give me your identification, Ma’am”? Shouldn’t they need to–oh, I dunno–suspect that I am one of the uber-terrible criminals they are supposedly hunting for with their military gear? Aside: shouldn’t I have learned this without going to law school? Ugh.

Here’s the setup: Strieff walks out of a house; officer stopped him, questioned him, took his identification, and ran it through some sort of active warrant database. The officer did not suspect Strieff of wrongdoing. The State of Utah recognizes “this stop was illegal.” There is also precedent (which supposedly matters):

An officer breaches that protection when he detains a pedestrian to check his license without any evidence that the person is engaged in a crime. — Delaware v. Prouse

The officer deepens the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for evidence of wrongdoing. — Rodriguez v. United States

After his arrest, the officer searched Strieff, found drugs, and Strieff was ultimately charged with illegal drug possession. That’s the only reason this case even happened, the only reason the Supremes heard it, the only reason I read it, and the only reason why I am telling everyone about it. If the officer had not found drugs after this totally illegal (aka unconstitutional) seizure, Streiff would have basically no recourse. Sure, he *could* file a civil rights lawsuit, but oh wait, qualified immunity! Double ugh.

It is tempting in a case like this, where illegal conduct by an officer uncovers illegal conduct by a civilian, to forgive the officer. After all, his instincts, although unconstitutional, were correct . . . When “lawless police conduct” uncovers evidence of lawless civilian conduct, this Court has long required later criminal trials to exclude the illegally obtained evidence.

The law calls this ill-gotten evidence “fruit of the poisonous tree” and excludes it from admission at trial under, wait for it, the Exclusionary Rule. The *idea* is that officers will follow the rules and build a case based on evidence they can actually admit to the court. Scoff along with me! Scoff scoff scoff.

Applying the exclusionary rule, the Utah Supreme Court correctly decided that Strieff’s drugs must be excluded because the officer exploited his illegal stop to discover them. The officer found the drugs only after learning of Strieff’s traffic violation; and he learned of Strieff’s traffic violation only because he unlawfully stopped Strieff to check his driver’s license.

Did you catch that procedural tidbit? Both Utah’s Supreme Court and the State of Utah agree this was an illegal stop. Utah, progressive bastion and trend setter, thinks their officer crossed a constitutional line; the Supremes think otherwise.

To the Court, the fact that a warrant gives an officer cause to arrest a person severs the connection between illegal policing and the resulting discovery of evidence. This is a remarkable proposition: The mere existence of a warrant not only gives an officer legal cause to arrest and search a person, it also forgives an officer who, with no knowledge of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that person on a whim or hunch.

Who cares about all that pesky illegal or unconstitutional misconduct, right? There’s a warrant now! So, everything is fine. The Court goes so far as to cobble together a bogus “good-faith mistakes” argument that characterizes the officer’s illegal, unconstitutional misconduct as “‘negligent’ and therefore incapable of being deterred by the exclusionary rule.”

To recap: police can stop you for no reason, demand your ID, and then arrest and search you if you happen to have any active warrants in their handy database. But I mean, come on, how common are warrants anyway?

Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When a person with a traffic ticket misses a fine payment or court appearance, a court will issue a warrant . . . When a person on probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a court will issue a warrant.

That’s all it takes. And there are a lot:

The States and Federal Government maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses. Even these sources may not track the “staggering” numbers of warrants, “ ‘drawers and drawers’ ” full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and ordinance infractions.

Remember Ferguson, Missouri? A 2015 Department of Justice Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department  revealed that in a city of 21,000 people, 16,000 had outstanding warrants (76%). Under Strieff, an officer can just walk up to over 3/4 of the people in Ferguson and arrest them. I don’t remember this during any of the media coverage, but maybe I missed it. And it’s not just Ferguson. Sonia drops stats from New Orleans, Newark, and St. Louis. It’s widespread, systemic, and ripe for abuse. I mean “good-faith mistakes.” Right.

If you never read another case, just read this final section from Sonia’s dissent:

Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional experiences, I would add that unlawful “stops” have severe consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name. This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we condone officers’ use of these devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as second-class citizens.

Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is looking for more. This Court has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he wants—so long as he can point to a pretextual justification after the fact. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996) . That justification must provide specific reasons why the officer suspected you were breaking the law, Terry, 392 U. S., at 21, but it may factor in your ethnicity, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 –887 (1975), where you live, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972) , what you were wearing, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 –5 (1989), and how you behaved, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 –125 (2000). The officer does not even need to know which law you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction—even one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146 –155 (2004); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U. S. ___ (2014).

The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling you that you look like a criminal. See Epp, Pulled Over, at 5. The officer may next ask for your “consent” to inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you can decline. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 438 (1991) . Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand “helpless, perhaps facing a wall with [your] hands raised.” Terry, 392 U. S., at 17. If the officer thinks you might be dangerous, he may then “frisk” you for weapons. This involves more than just a pat down. As onlookers pass by, the officer may “ ‘feel with sensitive fingers every portion of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.’ ” Id., at 17, n. 13.

The officer’s control over you does not end with the stop. If the officer chooses, he may handcuff you and take you to jail for doing nothing more than speeding, jaywalking, or “driving [your] pickup truck . . . with [your] 3-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter . . . without [your] seatbelt fastened.” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318 –324 (2001). At the jail, he can fingerprint you, swab DNA from the inside of your mouth, and force you to “shower with a delousing agent” while you “lift [your] tongue, hold out [your] arms, turn around, and lift [your] genitals.” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (slip op., at 2–3); Maryland v. King, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 28). Even if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million Americans with an arrest record and experience the “civil death” of discrimination by employers, landlords, and whoever else conducts a background check. Chin, The New Civil Death, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1805 (2012); see J. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 33–51 (2015); Young & Petersilia, Keeping Track, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1341–1357 (2016). And, of course, if you fail to pay bail or appear for court, a judge will issue a warrant to render you “arrestable on sight” in the future. A. Goffman, On the Run 196 (2014).

This case involves a suspicionless stop, one in which the officer initiated this chain of events without justification. As the Justice Department notes, supra, at 8, many innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught 119–138 (2015). But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow 95–136 (2010). For generations, black and brown parents have given their children “the talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and Me (2015).

By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.

We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. See L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner’s Canary 274–283 (2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.

Now that’s a dissent.

Learn more about this case and these ideas:

Oral Arguments & Case Background
Opinion & Dissent
Fourth Amendment: Overview
Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry
America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry

Deepest condolences to the family and friends of civil rights legend, Justice Cruz Reynoso, who passed away today.  Justice Reynoso was the first Latino Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, first Latino appointed to the Third District Court of Appeals and one of the first Latino law professors in the country. A native of California, Justice Reynoso grew up in a family of farmworkers who immigrated from Jalisco, Mexico. As a child growing up, he picked grapes, walnuts and plums in the Central Valley. He was told that he would never attend college.

Justice Reynoso not only went to college, but law school and later became one of the co-founders and the first Latino director of California Rural Legal Assistance. He fought for striking farmworkers and advised Cesar Chavez. “When your justice bone is hurt very often you need to be a trouble-making person,” he would say.

His legacy included helping to draft the 1986 “amnesty” bill under President Reagan, which allowed nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants to gain status. In 2000, Justice Reynoso received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the United States’ highest civilian honor, for his efforts to address social inequities and his public service. Justice Reynoso’s life was commemorated in a 2010 documentary by Abby Ginzberg called “Cruz Reynoso: Sowing Seeds of Justice.”

In 2016, the Sacramento chapter of the state’s preeminent Latino lawyers group, La Raza Lawyers, decided to rename itself the Cruz Reynoso Bar Association in his honor. Justice Reynoso helped found the organization four and a half decades ago. Learn more about Justice Reynoso in this video narrated by clinic alum Brian Lopez, ’12 current president of Cruz Reynoso. And find his full obituary in the L.A. Times.

Thank you for your legacy, Justice Reynoso. Si se puede!

 

 

The eight third-year students in the Federal Defender Clinic in Spring 2021 have been busy working on every stage of misdemeanor federal cases.  “Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, their participation has been remote, but this has not deterred them from ably representing their clients as certified misdemeanor student attorneys in federal court,” says Federal Defender Clinic co-director Rachelle Barbour.

The students of the Federal Public Defender represented dozens of clients each month during regular misdemeanor and veterans court intake calendars.  The students also engaged in motions hearings and disputed sentencing hearings.  The federal misdemeanor docket has particularly impacted by COVID closures in 2020, with numerous cases being prepared for trial in the next few months.  Despite the changes in practice, the Federal Defender Clinic students have rapidly learned how to use technology to continue to provide strong, effective representation for their clients.

Student Spotlight

To date, Federal Defender Clinic students have participated in three bench trials on Zoom. One bench trial was done by Richanne Roope with assistance from Gonzalo Duran—both who were also alums of the Immigration Clinic. And recently, students Hector Perla and Garrett Porter represented a client accused of alleged timber theft from the El Dorado National Forest.  The government failed to prove the case and the client was acquitted. In their case, student attorneys showed that the client had properly used his timber permit.  “Key to that victory was an excellent opening statement by Garrett and a superb cross-examination of an officer by Hector,” reports Linda Allison, co-director of the Federal Defender Clinic.

Allison shares that Student lawyers Josh White, Brittany Gamlen, Henry Ng and Ryan Dugan have been doing fantastic work as well in helping to prepare for the trials and managing their own caseloads. “Josh was singled out by a judge after court today for going above and beyond for a blind, homeless client,” reports Allison. “His client did not have the means to appear via Zoom so for each court appearance Josh went and picked her up in his car and appeared in court with her.” Students continue to work hard as the Clinic prepares for a number of bench trials scheduled for April and May.

This week, I am returning to my series on innovative courses.  This posting will feature courses that focus on law and technology.

The list below reflects courses from nine different law schools and includes twelve law and technology courses that I divided into four categories: (1) Courses that focus on creating and using technology in the legal space, (2) courses that focus on digital currency and business, (3) courses that focus on law practice technologies, and (4) courses that focus on cyber-torts, cyber-crimes, and digital privacy and security.

However, I will start with a quick overview of Penn State Law’s Law, Science, and Technology Concentration.

A Quick Aside on Penn State’s Law, Science, and Technology Concentration

The concentration requires JD students to complete 12 credit hours. Particularly exciting courses (to me) include:

  • AI’s Past, Present, and Future
  • COVID-19: Law and Tech Policy
  • Cybercrime
  • Emerging Technology & Legal Practice
  • Information Privacy Law
  • Information Security Law
  • Internet Law
  • Virtual Lab (detailed below)

For more details on the concentration, see this link.

Courses that Focus on Creating and Using Technology in the Legal Space

Southern University Law Center offers an intriguing course called “Intro to Intelligent Legal Systems.”  In this course,

Students will learn the entrepreneurial experience firsthand to better serve tomorrow’s clients by experiencing tech entrepreneurship themselves, learning about business by running a business that involves the creation and launch of legal apps. Students will design technology that helps solve criminal and social justice problems facing many urban areas today. Through this exercise, students will hone their abilities to educate themselves about an area of the law and use that knowledge to imagine tech solutions, solutions with commercial potential. The goal of the course is to inspire students to launch their legal apps in real-world situations to real-world clients.

The University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law offers a similar course.  “Selected Projects in Law, Technology & Public Policy” is a 2 or 3 credit, project-based course that is:

[T]aught collaboratively with law faculty, business faculty, and an engineering faculty member. Law students are taught about community engagement, project planning, design thinking, change management, interviewing, surveying, and focus groups. Students work on technology-related, civic and social entrepreneurship projects for Kansas City or other municipalities with technology support from the Code for America Brigade.

University of Connecticut School of Law offers a 3-credit seminar on “Technology and Law Practice,” which is described as:

In this course, students are expected to work in small teams with a legal service organization to develop a platform, application, or automated system that increases access to justice and/or improves the effectiveness of legal representation. For the final project, each team will have developed and/or built a functional app or automated system that is adopted by the legal service organization and put into use for the organization or its clients. Students are not required to have coding or programming experience and will not be expected to write software.

Boston University School of Law and UC Berkeley collaborate on a course offering called “Law for Algorithms” taught by Andrew Sellars. The course description explains:

Algorithms – those information-processing machines designed by humans – reach ever more deeply into our lives, creating alternate and sometimes enhanced manifestations of social and biological processes. In doing so, algorithms yield powerful levers for good and ill amidst a sea of unforeseen consequences. This cross-cutting and interdisciplinary course investigates several aspects of algorithms and their impact on society and law. Specifically, the course connects concepts of proof, verifiability, privacy, security, trust, and randomness in computer science with legal concepts of autonomy, consent, governance, and liability, and examines interests at the evolving intersection of technology and the law. Grades will be based on a combination of short weekly reflection papers and a final project, to be completed collaboratively in mixed teams of law and computer science students. This seminar will include attendees from the computer science faculty, students and scholars based at Boston University and UC Berkeley.

Finally, Loyola Law School’s “Artificial Intelligence and Access to Justice Practicum” 3-credit course gives students the opportunity to:

work in small teams with a legal service organization to develop a platform, application, or automated system that increases access to justice and/or improves the effectiveness of legal representation. For the final project, each team will have developed and/or built a functional app or automated system that is adopted by the legal service organization and put into use for the organization or its clients. Students are not required to have coding or programming experience and will not be expected to write software.

Penn State’s Virtual Lab offers a distinctive variant. According to the linked story, the Virtual Lab:

The Legal-Tech Virtual Lab reinvents the idea of a computer lab, piloting the lab of the future as a virtual space, built around a set of technologies and opportunities to learn about them rather than simply a physical room. Partnering with leading legal technology companies and interdisciplinary partners across Penn State, the lab will (1) train Penn State Law students in the ways these groundbreaking technologies are being implemented in today’s legal practice; (2) enable law and other Penn State students to explore the legal issues surrounding emerging technology; and (3) develop innovative educational content using those technologies.

Courses that Focus on Digital Currency, Law, and Business

The Northern Kentucky University Chase College of Law’s “Digital Commerce and the Law” 3-credit elective course addresses e-commerce law and digital currency.

The course description explains:

As commerce shifts to the Internet and mobile technologies, the law has been forced to adapt to the realities of the e-commerce marketplace. Consumers and businesses buy and sell goods or services through virtual storefronts using digital contracts, paying with digital currency, and, in some cases, resolving disputes online. Meanwhile, blockchain technology has offered new ways to document and to pay for e-commerce transactions through smart contracts and cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin. This course will address e-commerce common and regulatory law, with a special emphasis upon blockchain technology.

In “Smart Contracts and Financial Technology,” a course developed by Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, CA, students explore blockchain technology and its legal effects. The course description explains that the course is:

A workshop exploring the legal implications of blockchain and distributed ledger technologies, with a focus on cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin), smart contracts and other financial use cases. The class will feature a close exploration of the network and cryptographic features of Bitcoin, the first and most utilized cryptocurrency built on the blockchain. The class will then review blockchain technology more broadly in order to appreciation its suitability (advantages and limitations) for a variety of ‘smart contract’ use cases, including payments, swaps and other derivatives, and land transfer. A number of biomedical blockchain use cases will also be examined.

Courses that Focus on Law Practice Technologies

The third course in this category is “Law Practice Business and Technology” taught at NSU Florida’s Shepard Broad College of Law.” The course description for “Law Practice Business and Technology” explains:

This course examines the operations of successful private practice require an understanding of the primary tools used to efficiently deliver legal services and meet the ethical and professional obligations to provide competent representation. Lawyers need to understand the law firm business, operations, and relevant technology if they are to succeed in the profession. This workshop provides hands on experience for students on a number of key operational aspects of the practice of law, including the business foundation of a successful law firm management; privacy and data security in a law office environment, including but not limited to security and confidentiality of client information; marketing, public relations, advertising and social media; duties of technological competence under ABA “Ethics 20/20” amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility; predictive coding and other eDiscovery issues; client intake and case management; and issues related to the scope and composition of representation including the unauthorized practice of law and unbundled legal services.

The University of South Carolina School of Law offers a course called “Technology Law: Law of the Newly Possible” taught by Associate Professor Bryant Walker Smith. This course:

[E]xplores the relationship between law and technology through unique, immersive, and collaborative case studies that emphasize impact. The class has partnered with Virgin Hyperloop One on state regulatory strategies for ultra-fast tube transport and with UberElevate on policy considerations for flying taxis. Most recently, students consulted numerous stakeholders to develop public recommendations for the local regulation of e-scooters. In each case, students work closely with each other and with experts in academia, government, industry, and civil society to understand not only law but also technology, policy, and business.

Courses that Focus on Cyber-Torts, Cyber-Crimes, and Digital Privacy and Security

The last category is a bit of a catch-all and includes three courses from Northern Kentucky University Chase College of Law.

  1. “Digital Crimes and Torts” is described as:

This is the age of the invisible criminal and tortfeasor, harming individuals, businesses, and governments under a cloak of anonymity and through the boundless reach of the Internet. Many crimes and torts were rare or nonexistent until this century—like cyber-attacks, cyberbullying, cyberextortion, cyberstalking, cyberterrorism, and cybertheft. This course will examine New Age crimes and torts and the legal challenges in imposing criminal and civil liability upon those who commit them.

  1. “Legal Boundaries in the Digital Age” is described as:

Technology extends the reach of individuals, organizations, and governments beyond borders, posing one of the greatest legal challenges in the Digital Age. A single action on the Internet can have consequences far beyond where the actor resides—stealing an identity, subverting an election, threatening a public utility—raising questions about what laws, and what governing bodies, will protect victims and punish those that harm them through technology. This course will examine the obstacles to enacting and enforcing laws to govern cyberspace and the real world when developing technologies create challenges to the lawful authority of governments to regulate technology.

  1. “Digital Privacy and Security” is described as:

The exponential and infinite proliferation of big data raises both privacy and security issues, as the sensitive information of individuals, organizations, and governments are collected and stored online where it can be hacked or misused without authorization. This course will explore the developing, complex web of laws, national and international, that govern data privacy and cybersecurity. More specifically, it will examine the limitations of the existing legal framework and consider the policy implications of greater regulation of data collection over the Internet and the evolving Internet of Things.

In May 2020, McGeorge alumnus Aaron Brieno, ‘14 joined Professor Cathy Christian as Co-Director of the McGeorge Legislative and Public Policy Clinic. “One of the biggest reasons why I teach is to ensure that students of all backgrounds have access to public policy making tools,” says Brieno, who currently serves as the Deputy Chief of Staff for California State Senator Ben Hueso. “Ideally the Clinic provides students with tools they can bring back to their community as social impact leaders.”

Despite the challenges of COVID, Legislative and Public Policy students are thriving. “I am so proud that all of our students groups were able to either introduce a bill or work on a bill this year,” says Brieno. “No small feat since the California Legislature has limited the introduction of bills during COVID.”

Brieno and Professor Christian have exposed students to a number of legislators and public policy advocates during the course of the year. “We wanted to provide our students with a well-rounded experience and expose them to impactful leaders,” Brieno says. This spring alone, students heard from a panel of women legislators about their experiences in the Capitol and from “Just Mercy” film producer Scott Budnick about his anti-recidivism work in California.

Brieno himself has come full-circle since his days as a student at the Clinic. The grandson of migrant farm workers, Aaron was born and raised in California’s rural San Joaquin Valley. As a McGeorge student, the Legislative and Public Policy Clinic shaped the trajectory of his career. “The Clinic had a tremendously huge impact on my life,” says Brieno, crediting the mentorship of then clinic co-director and founder Rex Frasier,’00 and co-director Anthony Williams,’05.

As part of his mission to pay it forward, in 2016, Aaron founded a community-based organization, Inspire California, which provides free college prep resources, mentorship and college campus tours to high school students of Central Valley migrant farmworkers.

“My advice to McGeorge students interested in legislative and public policy work is to reach out to us,” says Aaron. “We are more than happy to set up a virtual coffee or put you in touch with a current student.”